Weaknesses in the US Air Force's Airlift Capacity in Conflict with China

The American airlift capability, essential for mobilizing troops, weaponry, and essential supplies globally, is both shrinking and aging. This trend threatens to place the military in a precarious situation should conflict arise with another major power, a recent analysis cautions.

Particularly concerning are the obstacles facing the US Air Force's strategic airlift operations, which might compromise its strategy of maintaining dispersed and resilient units during a confrontation with China.

In a paper by the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, retired Colonel Robert Owen, who piloted C-130 transporters during his over two-decade career and held a leadership role at the Air Mobility Command, contends that the current condition and capacity of the airlift fleet are inadequate for anticipated wartime requirements.

"In potential conflicts with major powers," he cautions, "the current airlift resources may fall short in addressing the movement, supply, and logistical needs of the forces."

"Particularly, the Air Force may not possess enough airlift capability to execute its Agile Combat Employment (ACE) strategy," Owen asserts, referring to a plan designed to decentralize assets to prevent the adversary from easily neutralizing US air force capabilities in one blow.

The existing fleet, which includes C-17s, adapted commercial planes, and helicopters, is becoming obsolete and inadequate for high-stakes warfare. The necessity for modernization is growing, given that these frames are often decades old, a stark contrast to the younger fleet at the Cold War's conclusion.

Specific aircraft, such as the C-17, are flying past their originally intended lifespans. The Air Force's 52 large C-5M Super Galaxy planes are averaging 37 years old and face low operational readiness, a scenario not unique to these aircraft alone.

Former Air Force chief of staff, Gen. David Allvin, highlighted in March that the average age of aircraft across the service had increased from 17 years in 1994 to 32 by 2024, paired with reduced availability.

Concerns about airlift capacity have been echoed by other military officials, noting declines since the Desert Storm operations of the 1990s until now. Overworked fleets have met relentless operational demands spanning three decades globally.

Owen elaborates on the ACE plan, which involves frequent and unpredictable rotations of fighter units and support teams between established bases and forward operating points.

While prepositioned supplies and allied support can sustain the first two basing methods, smaller fighter units deployed at forward bases heavily rely on C-17s and other tactical air mobility aircraft for resources and personnel.

The Air Force has rigorously trained under the ACE framework, conducting operations from unconventional locations, including simple airstrips or even highways.

Despite this preparation, Owen points out that the Air Force has not procured a sufficient number of aircraft to meet the lower-end requirements for operating in less developed airfields. There are no known plans or budget allocations to address this shortfall.

Without strategic prioritization to expand and maintain the airlift fleet, it's a serious issue for the Department of Defense.

These airlift challenges represent only a portion of the difficulties the Air Force faces, having diminished in size and aged heavily since the Cold War era, while simultaneously handling prolonged counterterrorism and counterinsurgency conflicts.

Military leaders, retired Air Force members, and defense analysts voice increasing concerns that as the US contends with a shrinking fleet, China's air power continues to expand and modernize quickly.

Although the US maintains significant advantages in stealth, logistics, combat experience, and global alliances, China's persistent enhancement of military capabilities poses a challenge, steadily altering the strategic risk landscape.