Susceptibility of Secure Communications for Police and Military Radios

Susceptibility of Secure Communications for Police and Military Radios

Investigators in the Netherlands have uncovered vulnerabilities in an encryption protocol embedded within radios used by sectors like essential services, law enforcement, intelligence, and military globally, potentially allowing unauthorized interception.

The drawback was revealed in 2023, prompting the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) to recommend additional end-to-end encryption to secure communications operated under the logically flawed algorithm.

Currently, it appears that even an ETSI-endorsed end-to-end encryption application exhibits similar fragility. This particular solution begins with a 128-bit security key, yet compresses it to 56 bits during encryption, making data interception plausible. It remains uncertain who may employ this compromised solution, nor is it clear if users recognize this risk.

End-to-end encryption, albeit costly, is vital for agencies like police and covert military or intelligence units due to its added security layer. The broader deployment of this encryption protocol since its promotion to remedy earlier encryption shortcomings implies a potentially wider user base.

Network security experts, Carlo Meijer, Wouter Bokslag, and Jos Wetzels, unveiled issues within the TETRA (Terrestrial Trunked Radio) encryption suite, incorporated into communication systems since the 1990s by manufacturers like Motorola and Sepura. Public disclosure was delayed as ETSI restricted examination of proprietary cryptographic systems for years.

The security team discovered a flaw only after meticulously dissecting and analyzing an E2EE setup within a Sepura-made radio system. Their discoveries are scheduled for presentation at the prestigious BlackHat security symposium in Las Vegas.

Although ETSI clarifies that the disputed end-to-end encryption is not part of its standard, having been crafted by The Critical Communications Association (TCCA), the strong collaboration between ETSI and TCCA might have influenced the encryption’s adoption.

While telecommunications based on TETRA specifications aren’t adopted by U.S. police or military, many international forces, including those in Belgium, Scandinavian, Eastern European, and Middle Eastern countries, do rely on them. How many integrate end-to-end encryption remains uncertain.

Encryption within TETRA involves four algorithms: TEA1-4, each catering to different security needs based on geography and end-user profiles. For instance, TEA2's usage is confined to European sectors, while others like TEA1 serve critical infrastructures worldwide, underscoring diverse applications and export restrictions.

Alarmingly, researchers identified that the 80-bit security key in TEA1 reduces to just 32 bits, grossly weakening its efficacy, exploitable within a short timeframe to decode sensitive communications.

The end-to-end encryption currently installed employs a stronger base key than TETRA but still compacts it to 56 bits, perpetuating vulnerabilities. Another discovered flaw allows misinformation through fraudulent or replayed messages, affecting systems globally utilizing TCCA's encryption protocol.

Voice injection and message replay capabilities persist because of structural deficiencies within the TCCA protocol, a flaw not confined to one manufacturer but affecting multiple end users and contexts.

ETSI's archival commentary notes that TEA1's key reduction adheres to historical export controls, where 32 bits were once deemed secure. Enhanced computation abilities, however, render such measures increasingly inadequate.

ETSI further explains that key choices generally reside between suppliers and customs rather than adhering to ETSI's guidance. This autonomy allows adaptations but only within regulatory constraints governing encryption standards and implementations.

Verification of TCCA’s unspecified key lengths isn’t possible for researchers due to NDA constraints, yet algorithm identifiers within the system suggest multiple key length options—from 56 to 128 bits—are available depending on regulatory obligations and customer requirements.

Whether all users are informed about the reduced security key risk is ambiguous. Confidential documentation from 2006 includes Sepura's export regulation-related key length adjustments, although transparency to customers across manufacturers varies.

Government agencies using TCCA’s encryption are presumed knowledgeable about the protective extent of their tech, according to official statements. Yet, skepticism prevails regarding complete awareness, especially from non-Western governments possibly unaware of significant security reduction consequences.

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